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Last week on Tuesday, with its decision in Opinion 2/15, on the Union’s competence to conclude ‘new generation’
EU trade and investment agreements, the Court dropped a bombshell. The Court’s ruling is set to significantly
simplify the EU’s international economic relations with third countries. If the Commission, the Council and the
member states had demanded clarity as to which institutions may legitimately pursue the Union’s external action
objectives in its commercial relations: clarity is what they earned. The decision indeed has the potential to greatly
facilitate an ‘EU-only’ signing and conclusion of future EU trade agreements. At the same time, as we argue below,
the Court’s reasoning entails a number of contradicting elements that may add confusion over the legal parameters
of post-Lisbon EU external relations conduct.
Overall, the Court created the conditions for more effective, efficient, and politically legitimate EU external economic
action while preserving its own credibility as the ultimate EU arbiter. Indeed, the Court has done no less than giving
a clear mandate to the institutions of the EU, while placing a good amount of investment related homework on the
desks of the member states.
The ‘CETA drama’ associated with the Wallonian opposition to the signing, provisional application, and conclusion of
the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Partnership Agreement (CETA) had cast significant doubts over the
Union’s ability to exercise its role as the driver of EU external economic integration. The ‘Wallonian Saga’, and the
veto-powers of member states when external treaties are concluded as mixed agreements, had exposed
considerable weaknesses of the Union as an external actor associated with problems related to democratic
representation as well as effectiveness and efficiency of CCP governance.
With its decision in Opinion 2/15, the Court provides permissive guidelines as to how mixed treaty making can be
avoided through alternative design of EU trade and investment agreements. The EUSFTA does indeed reflect a
blueprint of contemporary EU trade and investment agreements. With the exception of provisions relating to portfolio
investment and the contentious ISDS mechanism, the Court now held that all components of the agreement can be
concluded by the EU alone and without the approval of the member states in their own right. These conclusions,
admittedly, cast dark clouds over the future of the EU investment policy and, at the very least, the Commission’s
endeavour to reform the current BIT system by means of a multilateral investment Court. In this area, the Court
places the member states in the driver’s seat. At the same time, the decision affords EU exclusive external
competence over a vast amount of areas of EU external economic action and dismisses scores of member states’
‘attempts of mixity’, which they had put forward in their written submissions to the Court and the Court’s hearing in
September of last year. Overall, the CJEU thereby further confirms the 2009 Lisbon Treaty reform of the Common
Commercial Policy provisions and continues to walk on the path it had chosen in its post-Lisbon judgments on
Daichii Sankyo and the Conditional Access Convention . In this spirit, the Court reaffirms that “the FEU Treaty differs
appreciably from the EC Treaty previously in force, in that it includes new aspects of contemporary international
trade in that policy. The extension of the field of the [CCP] by the FEU Treaty constitutes a significant development
of primary EU law” (Opinion 2/15, para 141).
The Opinion of the Court
However, did the Court manage to advance such clear dividing lines in a legally sound manner? In December of last
year, Advocate General Eleonor Sharpston had advanced a considerably more restrictive reading  of the EUSFTA in
light of the EU treaties. In her view, EUSFTA provisions governing non-commercial aspects of intellectual property
rights, certain transport services, portfolio investment, as well as the agreement’s sustainable development
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provisions (labour rights; environmental protection) made for competences shared with the member states.
According to the AG, moreover, a single provision obliging the member states to terminate their bilateral investment
treaties with Singapore upon entry into force made for an MS exclusive competence.
The key to understanding the Court’s conclusions and its ability to clear the way for effective and efficient Union
external economic action derives from an examination of the applicable standards of analysis and respective
benchmarks. The Court, we find, used all the discretion available to it to produce a ‘middle way’ result with a view to
enabling more effective, efficient, and legitimate governance of the Union’s external economic relations, while
seeking to preserve the integrity of its role as the ultimate arbiter. However, as we argue below, it appears that the
coherence of the Court’s legal reasoning, in some instances, has fallen victim to the purposes this decision
seemingly attempts to advance.
First, in comparison to AG Sharpston’s legal view, the Court applies a more inclusive ‘aim and content’ test to the
EUSFTA in light of CCP Article 207 TFEU, which enables it to subsume EUSFTA content under the said provision in
a more ‘generous’ manner. More precisely, the Court advances a wider application of the ‘immediate and direct
effects on trade’ criterion, which it had developed in its past jurisprudence (Daiichi Sankyo (Case C-414/11) para 51;
Commission vs Parliament and Council (C-411/06) para 71; Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia and ERSA (C-
347/03) para 75). By the same token, the Court’s reasoning embeds the CCP into the context of EU external action
objectives and thus gives full effect to the Lisbon reform in this regard. The combination of these two contingencies
led the Court to the rather historic conclusion that the EUSFTA provisions on labour rights and environmental
protection fall under the EU exclusive competence attributed to the CCP. In Article 13.1(3) EUSFTA, notably, the
parties “recognise that it is inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by weakening or reducing the protections
afforded in domestic labour and environment laws.” In view of the Court, the EUSFTA provisions – by setting out
minimum standards to which the parties are committed in context of other multilateral agreements – reaffirm the
parties’ commitment not to lower the protections afforded to labour and the environment in order to gain a
competitive commercial advantage. Such provisions, according to the Court, hence sufficiently affect trade among
the parties to fall within the ambit of the CCP (para 147; 157).
Secondly, the Court casts a significantly wider web for ‘incidental’ treaty content than the Advocate General.
Incidental treaty components or provisions, according to the Court’s jurisprudence, are subordinated to the
agreement’s predominant purpose (i.e. commerce within the meaning of the CCP Article 207 TFEU) if they are
‘extremely limited in scope’ and thus do not have the potential to affect the allocation of competences (e.g.
Commission vs. Council (Case C-377/12) para 34). In application of a markedly more generous understanding of
what is ‘extremely limited in scope’, the Court dismisses the AG’s findings that ‘moral rights’ and ‘inland waterway
transport’ could make for autonomous EUSFTA components. The Court hence does not require reference to legal
bases for which the Union shares competence with the member states (para 129; 216-217).
Third, the Court, if compared to the AG’s opinion, advances a considerably more lenient interpretation of implied
exclusive powers with respect to its ERTA case law (Commission vs Council C-22/70 para 17), which results in a
broader shelter for EUSFTA transport services commitments. According to the ERTA jurisprudence, the EU may
obtain exclusive external powers if an area is covered to a large extent by common internal rules, which may be
altered or affected by the conclusion of an international agreement (Article 3(2)(3) TFEU). While the Court confirms
the validity of the transport services carve-out from the scope of the CCP (Article 207(5) TFEU), it found that
exclusive EU powers for maritime, road and rail transport services could indeed be implied via Article 3 (2)(3) TFEU
(paras 193, 202, 211). Building on its reasoning in Green Network and Opinion 3/15, the Court adopted a
permissive application of the ERTA test’s “largely covered” criterion: even if EU legislation leaves considerable
legislative powers to the Member States, it may still be affected or even altered by the conclusion of an international
agreement. Complete internal harmonization is thus not required to trigger the ERTA effect. Indeed, the Court
argued that any material overlap between EU internal and international commitments automatically “must be
regarded as capable of affecting or altering the scope of those common rules” (para 201).
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Fourth, the Court does not, in contrast to the AG, deem the termination of the Member States’ bilateral investment
treaties as a competence falling within exclusive national prerogatives. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) liberalisation
and protection form part of the EU’s exclusive CCP competence (para 87). Accordingly, the EU superseded the
Member States for FDI and may approve, by itself, a provision in an international agreement with a third party that
replaces the Member States’ prior bilateral FDI commitments with Singapore (para 249). Rather than engaging in
the discussion of treaty termination provisions of the VCLT, the Court refers to the doctrine of functional succession,
which establishes “that the European Union can succeed the member states in their international commitments
when the member states have transferred to it […] their competences relating to those commitments and it
exercises those competences” (C-21/72, para 248). The Court left unaddressed, however, how such reasoning
would bode with its finding that the Union shares competence with the member states in respect to portfolio
investment. Does the termination of respective BITs, in their entirety, require the involvement of the member states in
their own right? Or does the doctrine of functional succession expand to shared external EU competence, so that
the EU could, in theory, also enter into international obligations alone that terminate the Member States BITs for FDI
as well as portfolio investment?
Fifth, the Court’s decision, in this instance, affirms AG Sharpston’s finding on portfolio investment and dismisses the
more artistic arguments of the Commission in favour of implied ERTA exclusivity on the basis of a primary law
provision, notably Article 63(1) TFEU. In doing so, the Court sets an important boundary for the ERTA doctrine:
Triggering Article 3 (2)(3) TFEU pre-supposes the existence of internal EU legislation. Primary law provision cannot
be altered or affected by international EU agreements (para 235). Yet, the Court found that the EU and the Member
States share the power to conclude non-direct investment agreements (Art. 216 (1) TFEU) (para 239). In addition,
the Court points out that, “as EU law currently stands”, there is no internal legislation that endows the EU with the
power to conclude international agreements in the field of portfolio investment (para 236). As a consequence, Article
3(2)(1) TFEU is currently not applicable, but may trigger exclusive competence once such legislation will have been
adopted. In contrast to treaty amendments, a respective secondary legal act may be adopted by QMV, depending on
the political will of the member states.
Sixth, in a finding that is set to disturb the international investment arbitration community, the Court rules that the
EUSFTA’s ISDS mechanism falls within a competence shared between the EU and the member states and thereby
objects to AG Sharpston’s reasoning. The AG, indeed, had considered that the investor-state dispute settlement
mechanism is accessory to the substantive investment protection obligations of the EUSFTA. According to the Court,
however, a regime that removes disputes from the jurisdiction of domestic courts may not be regarded as ancillary
(or: accessory) to such substantive obligations (para 292). Consequently, it “cannot be established without the
Member States’ consent” (para 292). It is puzzling, to say the least, that the Court does not endeavour to ground this
finding on an appropriate legal basis. Which legal basis, indeed, would confer a shared competence for the
establishment of an ISDS regime?
Finally, and most surprisingly, the final paragraph of Opinion 2/15 does not fully answer the preliminary question
posed by the Commission (para 205). The Court’s response does set out the division and nature of competences as
between the EU and the Member States. But it does not answer the question whether “the EU has the requisite
competence to sign and conclude alone the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore”.  AG Wahl and AG Sharpton, in
respective recent opinions, considered that the EU has the requisite power to conclude agreements that fall under
EU exclusive as well as shared powers. If an agreement contains content covered by exclusive and shared
competence, the choice of procedure is subject to the political discretion of the EU institutions and, ultimately, the
Council. In past commercial treaty-making practice, the EU institutions indeed opted for facultative mixity. However,
facultative “EU-only” agreements do exist, too. To name but one recent example: The Stabilisation and Association
Agreement with Kosovo was concluded by the Union alone. The Court, however, appears to eliminate the possibility
of facultative “EU-only” treaty-making. In various paragraphs of its decision, it concludes that the EUSFTA “cannot
be approved by the EU alone” because it contains substantive areas that fall under shared competence. The Court
therefore appears to equalise the effect of non-exclusive and non-existing EU external competence. What does this
finding mean for existing facultative EU-only agreements? And what is the value inherent to shared external
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competence in the first place, if the EU cannot exercise such competence without the consent of the member states
in their own right?
Outlook
Opinion 2/15 confirms the tectonic shifts of competence that the Lisbon Treaty has brought about in the area of EU
Common Commercial Policy. Treaty components governing trade in goods, services, commercial aspects of
intellectual property, government procurement, competition policy, FDI admission and protection, transport services,
e-commerce, and sustainable development provisions related to trade could now be concluded by the EU without
the participation of the member states in their own right. As such, broad ‘EU-only’ economic agreements are now on
the verge of becoming the new normal of EU external economic action, if such agreements were to exclude portfolio
and ISDS and conclude such components separately as mixed agreements.
The Court’s decision, in fact, places considerable pressure on the member states to concede to this opportunity and
to end the legal-political combat with the Commission over their involvement. With respect to portfolio investment,
too, the ball is now in the court of the member states. They may, eventually, wish to hand over exclusive external
competence over that second-to-last bastion of shared competence via the legal avenue of Article 3(2)(1) TFEU.
Moreover, should the member states eventually come to the conclusion that they ought to advance a sensible
reform of their old BIT regime, it is now up to national governments to take ownership and explain and sell the
proposed Investment Court System to their domestic constituencies.
Nonetheless, the Court has left the interested observer with some puzzling contradictions. Most importantly, does
the Court really intend to tell us that findings of shared competence render mixity mandatory? Moreover, where do
we find the legal basis for a shared competence to establish an ISDS mechanism? Thus, despite providing for much
needed clarity as to the scope of the CCP in light of ‘new generation’ of EU trade and investment agreements,
Opinion 2/15 appears to add new questions over the legal parameters applying to the substance and process of EU
trade and investment treaty-making.
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